IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION

CLERK US DISTRICT COURT HORTHERN DIST. OF TX FILED 2016 AUG 24 PM 4:56

| ARTHUR LEWIS DAVISON, | § | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------------|
| Petitioner, | § § | |
| V. | § 8 | 2:16-CV-0182 |
| | § | |
| LORIE DAVIS, Director, | § | |
| Texas Department of Criminal Justice, | § | |
| Correctional Institutions Division, | § | |
| | § | |
| Respondent. | § | |

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has filed with this Court a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Dalhart Unit in Dallam County, Texas pursuant to a February 15, 2011 conviction for the offense of DWI, 3rd or more out of Polk County, Texas, and the resultant 2-year sentence. *See State v. Davison*, No. 21638.¹ By his habeas application, petitioner challenges a February 10, 2016 prison disciplinary proceeding conducted at the Goree Trusty Camp wherein petitioner lost 200 days previously accrued good time credits as punishment.

In order to challenge a prison disciplinary adjudication by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner <u>must</u>, at a minimum, (1) be eligible for mandatory supervised release, and (2) have received a punishment sanction which included forfeiture of previously

¹On this date, petitioner's offense history on the online Offender Information Detail found on the TDCJ website also reflects a June 29, 2009 conviction for DWI, 3rd or more, and a 2-year sentence. *State v. Davison*, No. 20475.

accrued good-time credits. *See Malchi v. Thaler*, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000). In his habeas application, petitioner acknowledges he is <u>not</u> eligible for mandatory supervised release. *See* Question 16. A review of the online Offender Information Detail maintained by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice confirms petitioner is <u>not</u>, in fact, eligible for mandatory supervised release. As petitioner is not eligible for mandatory supervised release, he may not challenge a prison disciplinary proceeding by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. *See Malchi*, 211 F.3d at 958.

RECOMMENDATION

It is the RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner ARTHUR LEWIS DAVISON be DISMISSED.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

ENTERED this 24h day of August 2016.

CLINTON E. AVERITTE V

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the

event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the "entered" date directly above the signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the "entered" date. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled "Objections to the Report and Recommendation." Objecting parties shall file the written objections with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A party's failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in this report shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge in this report and accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).